"Neuroethics" is a young field wherein ancient questions about minds, persons, and society meet newfangled knowledge about brains, machines, and behavior. Most work in neuroethics falls into one of two discrete arms: the neurobiology of morality and the ethics of neuroscience and related technologies. The former involves the philosophy of the mind and experiments in neuropsychology. The latter arm, led by applied ethicists and scientists, considers the scientific basis and societal implications of neuroscience research and technologies, including psychopharmacology, neuroimaging, forensic neuroscience, and computer-brain interfaces.

The essays in *Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics* generally fall into one of these two camps and often represent top-shelf contributions to the field. One of the strengths of this volume is its strong, concise introduction to the philosophy of mind. The essays "On the Cusp" by Ralph Ellis and "The Mind-Body Issue" by Paolo Costa are solid summaries for the non-philosopher, while the more technical "Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues" by Paul Churchland is an impressive glimpse into contemporary theory of mind. "Can We Read Minds?" is a strong overview of perhaps the most hotly covered issue in neuroethics: the use of neuroimaging in lie detection and other ways of recording and interpreting thought.

Yet for all its strengths, *Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics* recapitulates a weakness in the field at large: the lack of robust clinical work. One possible exception to this trend is the essay on pain medicine by James Giordano, which is republished from an early volume of the journal *Neuroethics*. Using ideas from the philosophy of mind and applied ethics, Giordano demonstrates how the radically subjective nature of pain informs our duties, while deconstructing the imposing, technologically driven political economy of clinical pain medicine. This work manages to be one of the volume's most grounded and yet most theoretical essays and one that would please admirers of Heidegger, Foucault, and Haraway. This is a particularly impressive feat, knowing how insufficient the discipline of bioethics has been on the topic of pain.

Aside from Giordano's work, the volume tends to gloss over true clinical examples rather than incorporate them into robust theory. In psychiatry, for example, there are references to the use of cortisol testing and neuroimaging in the assessment of depression and its response to therapy; such techniques have little or no place in practice despite the allure of progress they embody. There are frequent mentions of the dangers of overprescribing drugs for childhood psychiatric disorders such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and bipolar disease, but no discussion of the risks and benefits of using such drugs or non-pharmacological treatments in developing brains and persons. Better integration of truly practical work --- such as Paul Ford's rigorous studies of clinical neuroethics consultation at the Cleveland Clinic, which is not included in this volume --- would help ensure that the discipline continues to focus on crucial questions looming before human society rather than being tempted into a fantasy of scientific progress.
